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 CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
We are not only able to think about things that are happening in the present or 
remember things that have happened in the past, but we are also capable of performing 
mental simulation.  This amazing capacity of the human mind refers to the ability to 
imagine things that may happen in the future and things that might have happened in the 
past.  One kind of mental simulation – counterfactual thinking – has been a focus of 
psychological research ever since Kahneman and Tversky’s (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982)  seminal chapter on the simulation heuristic. 
Counterfactual thinking refers to the imagination of scenarios that are contrary to 
fact.  Here we will define counterfactual thoughts as past conditional thoughts in which 
the antecedent is false.  Suppose that yesterday you were in a traffic jam on the way to a 
meeting and arrived late.  Subsequently you might have had the following counterfactual 
thought: ‘If I had left earlier I would have arrived on time.’ Although the consequent is 
also false in this example (you actually were late), in another counterfactual thought the 
consequent might not be undone (i.e. be true).  For example, you might think “Even if I 
had left earlier I still would have been late.” 
 The first example above is an example of an upward counterfactual thought.  In 
these types of counterfactual thoughts reality is compared to an alternative that is better 
than reality.  Counterfactual thoughts have been shown to occur spontaneously following 
negative affect (Sanna & Turley, 1996), and these spontaneous counterfactual thoughts 
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 are more frequently upward counterfactuals (Roese & Olson, 1997).  Upward 
counterfactual thinking has been described as functional, since it helps people avoid 
mistakes in the future that have occurred in the past (Roese, 1997).  According to Roese, 
upward counterfactual thoughts also increase negative affect, such as regret, in the short 
term.  Here we have decided to focus on upward, rather than downward counterfactual 
thoughts, since we are interested in studying the properties of the types of counterfactual 
thinking that have been shown to occur spontaneously (Roese, 1997) . 
 The neural correlates of counterfactual thinking have not yet been examined.  
However, a number of recent studies provide evidence linking counterfactual thinking to 
the prefrontal cortex.  Knight & Grabowecky (Knight & Grabowecky, 1995) describe the 
case of a man who had damage to his dorsolateral prefrontal cortex who appeared to have 
deficits in counterfactual thinking.  He neither expressed counterfactuals nor expressed 
counterfactual emotions, such as grief and regret.  
Impairments in counterfactual thinking have been shown to be related to 
schizophrenia (Hooker, Roese, & Park, 2000), which is a disorder involving many 
cognitive deficits related to the prefrontal cortex, such as working memory deficits (Lee 
& Park, 2005; Perlstein, Dixit, Carter, Noll, & Cohen, 2003) and executive functioning 
deficits (Pantelis et al., 1997).  Hooker and colleagues showed that individuals with 
schizophrenia generated less spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and had worse 
performance on the counterfactual inference test (C.I.T.), a multiple choice measure of 
counterfactual thinking, than normal controls.   
Similar results have been observed in Parkinson’s disease (McNamara, Durso, 
Brown, & Lynch, 2003).  Individuals with Parkinson’s disease also generated less 
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 spontaneous counterfactual thoughts and did worse on the C.I.T. than normal controls.  In 
addition, McNamara and colleagues showed that performance on these two measures of 
counterfactual thinking was positively correlated with performance on two tests 
associated with frontal lobe functioning (the Stroop and Tower of London tasks). 
It is unclear whether counterfactual thinking is more related to activity in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex or the orbitofrontal cortex.  Beldarrain and colleagues 
(Beldarrain, Garcia-Monco, Astigarraga, Gonzalez, & Grafman, 2005) showed that 
individuals with prefrontal cortex lesions had impaired spontaneous counterfactual 
generation, but not impaired performance on the C.I.T.  These deficits in counterfactual 
thinking did not differ with respect to lesion location (whether the lesion was in 
orbitofrontal cortex or dorsolateral prefrontal cortex).   
Individuals with lesions to the orbitofrontal cortex have been shown to experience 
less regret than normal controls after losing on a gambling task (Camille, Coricelli, Sallet, 
Pradat-Diehl, & Sirigu, 2004), and regret has been linked to upward counterfactual 
thinking (Zeelenberg & van Dijk, 2005).  Increased levels of regret following losses on a 
gambling task have also been correlated with increased activity in the medial 
orbitofrontal region as measured by fMRI (Coricelli et al., 2005). 
 Since the prefrontal cortex has been shown to be important in regret and 
counterfactual thinking, we decided to look at the neural correlates of counterfactual 
thinking in the frontal cortex.  In this study, we utilized Near Infrared Spectroscopy 
(NIRS), a noninvasive neuroimaging method that utilizes near infrared light, to examine 
hemodynamic activity associated with a counterfactual thinking task compared to a 
control task, which relied on causal thinking.  NIRS allows one to measure changes in 
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 levels of oxyhemoglobin (oxyHb), deoxyhemoglobin (deoxyHb), and total hemoglobin 
(totalHb) in the outer layers of the cerebral cortex.  It thus provides information not 
directly available from functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI), since fMRI is 
only sensitive to changes in deoxyHb.  The regions we looked at included the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex but not the orbitofrontal cortex.  We could not acquire images of the 
orbitofrontal cortex with NIRS because NIRS probes cannot be placed above this region, 
as that would entail placing the probes over the subjects’ eyes.   
We hypothesized that counterfactual thinking would be associated with higher 
maximum percent changes of oxyHb and totalHb and lower minimum percent changes of 
deoxyHb than causal thinking in the frontal cortex, since it is likely that counterfactual 
thinking requires larger cognitive resources that rely on the frontal cortex, such as 
working memory (Miller & Cohen, 2001).  People generally keep two possibilities in 
mind to understand counterfactual conditionals, but only one to understand factual 
conditionals (Walsh & Byrne, 2005).  Thus, it is likely that counterfactual thinking 
requires a larger load on working memory than non-counterfactual causal thinking. 
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 CHAPTER II 
 
METHODS 
 
 Twelve right-handed healthy individuals (six males and six females, with a mean 
age of 36.1 years (SD = 9.1) and a mean educational level of 15.7 years (SD = 1.8)) 
participated in this study.  Individuals with a history of substance abuse, head injury, 
mental illness, or neurological disorder were excluded. 
 Participants were given the WASI to measure full scale I.Q. (Mean = 104.5 (SD = 
12.4), the schizotypal personality questionnaire (SPQ) to measure schizotypal personality 
(Mean = 16.8 (SD = 10.6)), the PANAS to measure positive and negative affect (Mean 
PA = 30.5 (SD = 6.0), Mean NA = 16.4 (SD = 7.4)), and letter number sequencing to 
measure verbal working memory capacity (Mean Total Number Correct = 15.8 (SD = 
4.6), Mean letter number sequencing span  = 6 (SD = .7)).  In addition, participants were 
given a packet that contained the C.I.T., six logical thinking questions, and free response 
questions.  
 The C.I.T. is a four question multiple choice measure that examines an 
individual’s ability to think counterfactually.  For each item, two similar negative events 
for two different individuals are given followed by three response options.  This measure 
is based on research showing that counterfactual thinking is heightened by outcomes 
preceded by unusual, rather than typical actions, and also by events that almost occur 
(Roese, 1997).  The correct response for each item on the C.I.T. is the response that 
corresponds with one of these two factors shown to heighten counterfactual thinking.  
 5
 Further information about this task, including the items and responses is given in Hooker 
et al. (2000). 
Each logical thinking question contained three sentences.  The first sentence 
described a logical premise (e.g. “all ice is hot”) and the second sentence described a 
situation (e.g. “Ann has some ice.)”  The third sentence was a question that related the 
first two sentences to each other (e.g. “Is it cold?”).  Participants had to answer whether 
the third sentence was true, given the facts in the first two sentences.   
Each free response item described a story that was likely to elicit counterfactual 
thoughts in the reader.  After reading each story, participants wrote down any thoughts 
that came to mind.  The instructions for this task and one of the stories are listed in Table 
1.  We recorded the total number of counterfactual ideas participants wrote down for all 
four stories.  
 
Table 1.    Free response task 
 
Instructions: Please read each story below.  After each one, write whatever thoughts 
come to mind. 
 
1) Nick eats dinner at the same restaurant nearly every night.  One night he decided to 
try a new restaurant.  Nick got food poisoning that night. 
 
 
 
Imaging Task 
Each participant underwent NIRS scanning while completing four blocks of an 
imaging task.  Each block contained 40 pairs of stimulus and response sentences; with 10 
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 pairs of sentences in each of four conditions (Counterfactual Realistic (CfR), 
Counterfactual Unrealistic (CfU), Causal Realistic (CsR), and Causal Unrealistic (CsU)).   
For all conditions, a stimulus sentence was shown on the screen for 3500 
milliseconds.  This sentence described a negative event in the first person tense (e.g. “I 
spilled coffee on my pants”).  Stimulus sentences were in the first person tense and had a 
negative valence so that they would easily elicit upward counterfactual thoughts when 
they were followed by the response sentence in the CfR condition.  The stimulus sentence 
was directly followed by another sentence (response sentence) which was on the screen 
for 5500 milliseconds.   
For all four conditions, participants decided whether or not they agreed with the 
response sentence by pressing a key with their right hand.  Participants were instructed to 
respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.  A diagram of the task is shown in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
  
 
+ 
 
 
Stimulus Sentence 
 
    
   
   Response Sentence 
 
  Yes             No 
Fixation: 
4 - 26 
seconds 
3.5 seconds
5.5 seconds
Figure 1.  Diagram of one trial in the imaging task. 
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 For the counterfactual conditions, the second sentence described an action they 
should have done differently in the past.  For the CfR condition, the response sentence 
described an action that could have prevented the negative event in the stimulus sentence.  
It was compatible with an upward counterfactual thought, and thus was realistic, since 
people tend to spontaneously generate upward counterfactuals after negative events.   For 
the CfU condition, the response sentence described an action that would not have 
prevented the event, and may in fact have made it worse.  This condition was unrealistic, 
because people do not tend to spontaneously generate these types of counterfactuals after 
negative events.  Since the response sentence in the counterfactual conditions described 
something that may or may not have prevented the negative event, performing it required 
participants to think counterfactually about the event.  
For the causal conditions, the response sentence depicted something that either 
did (CsR) or did not follow (CsU) logically from the information in the stimulus sentence.  
The outcomes described in the CsR condition were realistic, while those described in the 
CsU condition were not.   
The correct response for realistic items was yes (agree) while that for unrealistic 
items was no (disagree).  An example of a sentence from each condition is shown in 
Table 2.   
A causal thinking task was used as a control task, because it was postulated that 
while both causal thinking and counterfactual thinking require logical thinking, 
counterfactual thinking requires something additional: the ability to mentally simulate an 
alternative that did not occur.  We used both realistic and unrealistic conditions of 
counterfactual and causal tasks to see if the cognitive and neural properties underlying 
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 counterfactual thinking relied on whether the thinking was realistic (i.e. whether it was 
specific for upward counterfactuals). 
 
Table 2.  Stimuli from each condition 
 
 
 
Condition 
 
 
 
 
Stimulus Sentence 
 
 
 
Response Sentence 
Counterfactual Realistic 
(CfR) 
 
I spilled coffee on my pants. 
 
I should have drank 
more carefully. 
 
Counterfactual Unrealistic 
(CfU) 
 
I spilled coffee on my pants. 
 
I should have drank 
less carefully. 
 
Causal Realistic 
(CsR) 
 
I spilled coffee on my pants. 
 
After that, my pants 
were wetter. 
 
Causal Unrealistic 
(CsU) 
 
I spilled coffee on my pants. 
 
After that, my pants 
were drier. 
 
 
 
 
An event related design was utilized.  Stimulus-response sentence pairs from all 
four conditions were randomized within each block.  The stimulus sentences used in each 
block were the same; however the exact response sentences paired with each stimulus 
sentence were different in each block, such that each stimulus sentence was paired once 
with a response sentence in each of the four conditions.  The order of blocks was 
counterbalanced across participants.  After each response sentence, subjects were 
instructed to look at a fixation cross; this intertrial interval ranged between 4 and 26 
seconds and was randomized across trials.  We randomly jittered the intertrial intervals to 
increase efficiency and so that we could extract the hemodynamic time courses associated 
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 with the tasks.  An exponential distribution of intertrial intervals was used to maximize 
efficiency.    
 The NIRS apparatus used was a Hitachi ETG 4000.  Signals for changes in oxyHb, 
deoxyHb, and totalHb in μmol/mml were acquired at a sample rate of 10 Hz from 
anterior regions in each hemisphere.  We utilized a 690-830 spectrometer composed of 
emitter-detector pairs.  One three by three probe set containing 12 data channels was 
placed over the frontal cortex in each hemisphere (see Figure 2 for locations of probe sets 
and channels).     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Blue dots indicate the channels that were measured. 
Each channel is listed with a different number. 
 
 
Figure 2.  Location of NIRS probe sets. 
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 Landmarks used for probe placement were the top of the eyebrows (the bottom of the 
probe set was placed directly above the top edge of the eyebrow) and the top part of the 
most anterior connection of the ears to the skull (the bottom corner of the probe set was 
placed on the skull next to this connection).  The path length for adults was 3 cm.  The 
detected signals were converted to chromophore concentrations by using the modified 
Beer-Lambert Law.  High and low pass filters and linear trend removal were applied to 
the data.  We extracted signal time courses on a channel by channel basis for the four 
conditions of the imaging task from deconvolution plots that had been corrected for serial 
correlations.  This data was deconvolved from the onset time of the response trials. 
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 CHAPTER III 
 
RESULTS 
 
The mean score for participants on the C.I.T. was 1.7  out of 4 items correct (SD 
= 1.2).  On the logical thinking task, participants answered on average 5.3 out of 6 items 
correctly (SD = 1.2).  For the free response questions, on average participants wrote 
down 1.4 counterfactual ideas for all four stories (SD = 2.1).  After correcting for 
multiple comparisons, there were no significant correlations between any of these 
variables and any of the other participant characteristics described in the Methods section.  
In addition, none of the other participant characteristics correlated significantly with each 
other. 
 
Imaging Task - Behavioral Data 
A repeated measures ANOVA of the effects of sentence type (counterfactual or 
causal) and realism (realistic or unrealistic) on the average number of items answered 
correctly was performed.  Participants answered an equal number of counterfactual and 
causal items correctly (F (1, 11) = .22, p = .65).  They also answered an equal number of 
realistic and unrealistic items correctly (F (1, 11) = 1.31, p = .28).  Furthermore, there 
was not a significant interaction of sentence type by realism (F (1, 11) = .02, p = .89). 
 Another repeated measures ANOVA was performed on the effects of sentence 
type and realism on response time for correct trials.  Response time for counterfactual 
and causal trials was equivalent (F (1, 11) = 3.12, p = .11).  The response time for 
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 realistic and unrealistic trials was also equivalent (F (1, 11) = 4.20, p = .07).  However, 
there was a significant interaction of sentence type by realism (F (1, 11) = 18.08, p 
= .001) on response time.  For counterfactual trials, participants responded more quickly 
for the realistic trials; however they responded at a similar speed for both types of causal 
trials (See Figure 3).  Pairwise comparisons showed that participants responded 
significantly faster for CfR than CfU trials (t (11) = -5.46, p < .001) and significantly 
faster for CsU than CfU trials (t (11) = 4.54, p <.001). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Bars indicate standard errors. 
 
Figure 3.  Graph of Mean Response Time for correct trials as a function of sentence type 
(counterfactual (Cf) and causal (Cs)) and realism. 
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 The means and standard deviations of the average number correct and the average 
response time for correct trials are listed in Table 3.  None of these variables correlated 
significantly with any of the other participant characteristics.  Furthermore, none of the 
response time variables correlated significantly with any of the accuracy variables. 
 
Table 3.  Means and Standard Deviations for Total Number Correct and Response Time 
for Correct Trials for each condition 
 
 
  Mean 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
We only analyzed correct responses because of the infrequency of incorrect and 
null (unanswered) response trials.  Participants answered 97.14% of all items correctly. 
 
 
 
SD 
CfR Total Correct 9.79 0.26
CfU Total Correct 9.67 0.29
CsR Total Correct 9.75 0.38
CsU Total Correct 9.65 0.25
CfR Response Time (ms) 2157.05 536.22
CfU Response Time (ms) 2355.69 554.42
CsR Response Time (ms) 2214.94 568.24
CsU Response Time (ms) 2181.55 552.15
 
Note: Maximum Total Correct is 10 
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 Imaging Data 
For all analyses on oxyHb and totalHb, we compared the maximum percent 
change in hemoglobin levels that occurred between 5 and 12 seconds after the onset of 
the response sentences of correct trials.  We performed similar comparisons for deoxyHb 
levels, except that we compared the minimum percent change, rather than the maximum 
percent change, that occurred between 5 to 12 seconds after the onset of the response 
sentences of correct trials. We chose to analyze these points of change, because NIRS 
studies have shown that neuronal activation generally leads to increases in oxyHb and 
totalHb, and decreases in deoxyHb (Sakatani, Katayama, Yamamoto, & Suzuki, 1999).  
Repeated measures ANOVAs of hemisphere by channel by sentence type by 
realism on changes of oxyHb, totalHb, and deoxyHb levels were performed.  We found 
significantly greater percent change maximums of oxyHb in the left hemisphere than in 
the right hemisphere (F (1, 11) = 4.9, p = .049).  There also was a significant interaction 
of hemisphere by realism on maximum percent changes of oxyHb (F (1, 11) = 11.34, p 
= .006).  Figure 4 shows that in the left hemisphere there were lower maximum percent 
changes of oxyHb for realistic than unrealistic trials, while in the right hemisphere the 
maximum percent changes were higher for realistic than unrealistic trials.  None of the 
comparisons of hemisphere by realism reached statistical significance.  For totalHb and 
deoxyHb, none of the effects were significant. 
We also performed repeated measures ANOVAS for the effects of hemisphere by 
channel by sentence type by realism on time of maximum percent change (for oxyHb and 
totalHb) and minimum percent change (for deoxyHb).  For oxyHb and totalHb, none of 
the factors affected the time of maximum percent change.  However, for deoxyHb there 
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 was an effect of sentence type on time of minimum percent change (F (1, 11) = 9.74, p 
= .01), such that the time of minimum percent change for the counterfactual trials was 
later than that for the causal trials. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Bars indicate standard errors. 
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Figure 4.  Levels of mean maximum percent increases of oxyHb in the left and right 
hemisphere for realistic and unrealistic trials.   
 
 
 
Time courses for percent change of oxyHb, deoxyHb, and totalHb associated with 
each of the four conditions are given for one channel in each hemisphere (channel 5 – left 
hemisphere, and channel 13 – right hemisphere) in Figure 5.  The beta values on the y-
axis of the plots represent percent signal change from baseline.      
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Figure 5.  Hemodynamic Time courses. 
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 CfR and CsR conditions  
To observe the neural correlates of realistic counterfactual thinking, we compared 
the levels of most extreme percent change in hemoglobin for the CfR and the CsR 
conditions.  We postulated that any additional activity associated with the CfR condition  
over the CsR condition would be associated with realistic (upward) counterfactual 
thinking.  Repeated measures ANOVAS of hemisphere by channel by condition were 
performed on oxyHb, totalHb, and deoxyHb.  None of the effects were significant. 
 A paired comparison of the average number of correct counterfactual realistic and 
causal realistic items showed that participants answered an equivalent number of items 
correctly in both conditions (t (11) = -1.24, p = .24).  Similarly, a paired comparison of 
the average response time for counterfactual realistic and causal realistic items showed 
that response time was also similar (t (11) = .39, p= .70). 
 
CfU and CsU conditions 
 To observe the neural correlates of unrealistic counterfactual thinking we 
compared the levels of most extreme percent change in hemoglobin for the CfU and CsU 
conditions.  We postulated that any additional activity associated with the CfU over the 
CsU condition would be associated with unrealistic counterfactual thinking.  Repeated 
measures ANOVAS of hemisphere by channel by condition were performed on oxyHb, 
totalHb, and deoxyHb.  There was a significant effect of hemisphere on maximum 
percent change of oxyHb; maximum percent changes of oxyHb were higher in the left 
hemisphere (F (1, 11) = 6.00, p = .032) than in the right hemisphere.  There were no other 
significant effects for oxyHb, deoxyHb, and totalHb. 
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  A paired comparison of the average number of correct counterfactual unrealistic 
and causal unrealistic items showed that participants answered an equivalent number of 
items correctly in both conditions (t (11) = .233, p = .82).  As stated earlier in the paper, 
however, the response time for unrealistic counterfactual trials was slower than for 
unrealistic causal trials (t (11) = 4.54, p = .001). 
 
CfR and CfU conditions 
To observe the neural correlates of the realistic aspect of counterfactual thinking 
(the aspect associated specifically with upward counterfactual thoughts) we compared the 
levels of maximum percent change in hemoglobin for the CfR and CfU conditions.  We 
postulated that any additional activity associated with the CfR over CfU condition would 
be associated with realism of counterfactuals.  Repeated measures ANOVAS of 
hemisphere by channel by condition were performed on oxyHb, totalHb, and deoxyHb.  
There was a significant effect of hemisphere on maximum percent changes of oxyHb and 
totalHb.  Levels of maximum percent changes of oxyHb and totalHb were higher in the 
left hemisphere (oxyHb: F (1, 11) = 5.52, p = .039; totalHb: F (1, 11) = 6.52, p = .027) 
than in the right hemisphere. There were no significant effects for deoxyHb. 
A paired comparison of the average number of correct counterfactual realistic and 
counterfactual unrealistic items showed that participants answered an equivalent number 
of items correctly in both conditions (t (11) = 1.07, p = .31).  As stated earlier in the paper, 
the response time for unrealistic counterfactual items was slower than that for realistic 
counterfactual items (t (11) = -5.46, p < .001). 
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 CsR and CsU conditions 
To observe the neural correlates associated specifically with the realistic aspect of 
causal thinking we compared the levels of most extreme percent change of hemoglobin 
for the CsR and CsU conditions.  We postulated that any additional activity associated 
with the CsR over the CsU condition would be associated with realism (or correct logic).  
Repeated measures ANOVAS of hemisphere by channel by condition were performed on 
oxyHb, totalHb and deoxyHb.  There were no significant effects for oxyHb, totalHb, and 
deoxyHb. 
A paired comparison of the average number of correct causal realistic and causal 
unrealistic items showed that participants answered an equivalent number of items 
correctly in both conditions (t (11) = .81, p = .44).  In addition, response time was similar 
for trials in both conditions (t (1, 11) = .57, p = .58). 
We did not look at the effects of hemisphere, channel, and condition on time of 
most extreme percent change for any of the two condition comparisons.  We decided not 
to do this because we were primarily interested in looking at the magnitude, rather than 
the timings, of the most extreme percent changes of hemoglobin. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
In the current study, we observed similar levels of most extreme percent change 
of hemoglobin in frontal cortex for both counterfactual and causal thinking.  However, 
we also observed an effect of sentence type on the time of the minimum percent change 
of deoxyHb, such that the time of the minimum percent change of deoxyHb was later for 
the counterfactual than for the causal conditions. 
Participant accuracy was not affected by sentence type or sentence realism.  This 
may have been due to a ceiling effect in the task, since mean accuracy was over 95% for 
each condition.   Response time for correct trials was significantly affected by the 
interaction of sentence type and realism.  Multiple comparisons among the four 
conditions showed that response time for the CfU condition was significantly slower than 
that for the CfR and CsU conditions.  The longer response time for the unrealistic 
counterfactual items could have been related to the later time of minimum percent change 
in deoxyHb levels for the counterfactual trials. 
Our lack of activation and behavioral effects for counterfactual thinking may have 
been due to properties of the experimental task.   For both the counterfactual and causal 
imaging tasks, participants read stimulus sentences that depicted negative scenarios.  It is 
possible that participants automatically generated counterfactual thoughts after reading 
these stimulus sentences, because negative events often lead to spontaneous 
counterfactual thoughts.  However this is unlikely, because before beginning this study, 
 21
 we gave lists of stimulus sentences to 12 individuals (not those who participated).  Some 
of these sentences resembled those in the study while the other sentences were identical.  
Individuals were told to read each sentence and write down their thoughts.  Although 
some individuals did write down counterfactual thoughts; the occurrence of 
counterfactual responses was uncommon, consisting of only 4% of the total responses.     
 A more likely possibility is that while counterfactual and causal thinking may rely 
on similar neural substrates in the areas of frontal cortex that we examined, they may 
show differences in other regions, such as the orbitofrontal cortex.  This is entirely 
possible given the evidence linking regret to the orbitofrontal cortex (Camille et al., 2004; 
Coricelli et al., 2005) and the findings of reduced spontaneous counterfactual thinking in 
orbitofrontal patients (Beldarrain et al., 2005).  This latter study suggests that it may only 
be spontaneous counterfactual thinking that is linked to the frontal cortex.  If this is the 
case, our lack of hemodynamic differences could be due to the nature of our 
counterfactual task.  We primed individuals to have counterfactual thoughts by showing 
them “I should have” sentences in the counterfactual condition.  This type of task is 
different from tasks looking at spontaneous counterfactual thoughts, which typically have 
an individual talk about or write down what they are thinking about something, such as a 
negative event in their own past.  
We observed higher maximum percent changes of oxyHb overall in the left 
hemisphere than the right hemisphere.  This is not surprising, given the numerous 
findings linking language processes to the left hemisphere, and the fact that our task was 
a task that utilized language. 
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  We observed similar levels of most extreme percent change in the frontal cortex 
for processing realistic and unrealistic sentences.  There was, however, a significant 
interaction of hemisphere and realism on maximum percent changes of oxyHb in the 
frontal cortex.  In the left hemisphere there were higher maximum percent changes of 
oxyHb for unrealistic than realistic trials, while in the right hemisphere maximum percent 
changes of oxyHb were higher for realistic than unrealistic trials.  Although none of the 
pairwise comparisons of realistic and unrealistic trials in the left and right hemisphere 
reached significance, this significant interaction provides evidence that the right 
hemisphere may have a more important role in the processing of realistic information 
than unrealistic information.  The left hemisphere on the other hand, might have a more 
important role for processing unrealistic than realistic information.   
There is another possible interpretation of this effect.  In the unrealistic trials, 
there was a degree of cognitive conflict that was not present in the realistic trials, because 
for the unrealistic trials participants responded by answering that they didn’t agree with 
the response sentence.  It may be that the different levels of maximum percent changes of 
oxyHb in the two hemispheres for realistic and unrealistic trials were due to effects of 
this conflict.  However, since the data was deconvolved from the onset of the response 
sentence rather than the response time, response conflict is not likely to fully explain the 
different levels of activation.    
 
Limitations and Directions for Future research 
 
 Several limitations in this study can be addressed with future research.  One 
drawback of the current study is the small sample size used.  Differences in 
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 hemodynamic activity and performance between the counterfactual and causal tasks 
could have been occluded by low power.  Another drawback is that the NIRS maps of 
concentration changes were not aligned with structural images, making it difficult to 
know the specific brain regions that we examined.   This is further complicated by the 
fact that the relative locations of the structural markers (ears and eyebrows) we used to 
position the NIRS probe sets differed from participant to participant.  Furthermore, 
differences in accuracy and response time may have been occluded by task difficulty.  
Since all participants had near perfect accuracy across conditions, there likely was a 
ceiling effect on accuracy. 
 Future studies should investigate neural activity that is associated with 
spontaneous counterfactual thinking, since it is this type of thinking that is impaired in 
frontal patients (Beldarrain et al., 2005).  The challenge is to design a study that has both 
a task that naturally elicits counterfactual thoughts and a well-matched control task.  
Researchers should not constrain their studies to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.  Since 
the present study showed no differences in levels of most extreme percent change of 
hemoglobin in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and surrounding regions, future studies 
should also look at other areas, such as the orbitofrontal cortex.  Another important area 
of research will be to examine the cognitive and neural processes underlying realistic and 
unrealistic thinking.  The neural correlates for counterfactual thinking may be different 
for different types of counterfactual thoughts. 
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